Pager attack on Hezbollah: A low-tech gadget blitz redraws the contours of the Israel-Iran conflict Premium

CCTV footage of blasts in multiple parts of the Middle Eastern country surprised the Iran-backed Hezbollah as two of its fighters and an 8-year-old girl were killed. The militant group vowed to retaliate against Israel for the blasts. The simultaneous explosions occurred largely in the southern part of Lebanon—a Hezbollah stronghold. Israel’s military has declined to comment.

But the biggest surprise of this attack lies in the weapon used by the perpetrator. The devices behind the serial blasts were unsophisticated, low-tech gadgets: pagers.

Pagers, often called beepers, are communication devices that emerged in the mid-20th century. Their presence was eclipsed by the cellular phones that grew in popularity in the 1990s and 2000s. And subsequently, the dawn of the smartphone pushed the pagers into the shadows. But the humble, palm-sized device had its own strengths that played out well in specific circumstances.

Pagers operate using radio signals, which are transmitted by towers and received by the device. They function as either one-way or two-way systems. One-way pagers receive messages from a central transmitter but cannot send replies. That means a user can receive numeric or alphanumeric messages, and the device alerts them through a beep or vibration.

In a two-way system, the pagers are capable of handling communication in both directions. Users can receive and respond to messages, which makes them slightly more advanced, but these are still limited in functionality compared to modern smartphones.

Pagers rely on a network of radio towers that broadcast signals over a wide area. In many cases, they are more reliable than mobile phones in certain conditions because their communication system operates over simple, robust radio waves, often penetrating areas where cell coverage might be weak.

Despite their technological obsolescence in mainstream use, pagers are still valued in healthcare, emergency services, and remote locations where cellular networks are unreliable. Their simplicity ensures they are more energy-efficient and less prone to network outages.

Pagers are relatively unsophisticated compared to smartphones or other modern gadgets, which make them less susceptible to high-tech surveillance techniques. They don’t have GPS or internet connectivity, reducing the risk of location tracking and hacking. Intelligence agencies rely heavily on digital footprints, but pagers are harder to monitor remotely.

Secondly, pagers use radio frequencies, which makes it harder for interception compared to cellular or internet-based communication devices. This feature makes them ideal for sending short, encrypted, or coded messages in sensitive situations. And with one-way pagers, the risk of being detected is lower since the device does not transmit a response, making it difficult for intelligence agencies or adversaries to trace the origin or location of the message.

Thirdly, their simplicity plays a key role in how they can be manipulated, which could be a highly likely reason as to why it was used in the Hezbollah attack. Pagers can be modified to include circuits that trigger a signal when a specific message is received. These modifications are used in covert operations to activate explosives or send alerts without raising immediate suspicion.

Where else were low-tech, remote detonators used prior to the Hezbollah attack?

While it is unclear whether pagers were used to trigger blasts prior to the Hezbollah attack, there are several instances of remote detonators being used in conflict situations.

Armed groups use radio-controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to detonate explosives from a distance. Attackers use such systems to bomb high-profile targets, including police stations and government building.

These remote systems can even be deployed in a car or at the level of a doorbell to trigger explosions. And such devices are difficult to trace because they emit weak signals that could be mistaken for background noise or ignored by conventional detection methods. Simple everyday consumer electronics and communication gadgets can also be used to detonate IEDs remotely.

Their small size and outdated appearance make pagers an ideal device to send short, encrypted texts that can’t be picked up by the intelligence community. But turning that unsophisticated device into a weapon to attack an adversary is nothing short of a page from a spy novel.

While Israel has declined to comment on the blasts, it is overwhelmingly clear who could have pulled off such a massive operation.

A Reuters report revealed that the pagers in the explosion bore Gold Apollo’s branding. While the Taiwan-based company has denied making the pagers used in the blasts in Lebanon, the company’s founder, Hsu Ching-Kuang, clarified that the devices were manufactured by a European firm licensed to use their brand.

Gold Apollo insists it was not responsible for the product and expressed embarrassment over the incident. Hezbollah, a militant group, reportedly ordered thousands of pagers, which they believed could help evade Israeli tracking systems.

Experts are hypothesising myriad ways by which this attack could have been planned and executed. But there is nothing conclusive yet. It is unclear whether the devices were bugged at the manufacturing level or at the supply chain level.

Nevertheless, the pager attack comes amid growing tensions between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah. The duo have been exchanging fire across the Israel-Lebanon border since the start of the Gaza war in October. And this operation could very well start a new phase in the prolonged regional conflict.

Published - September 18, 2024 02:19 pm IST